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May 30, 2006 1 Introduction
A considerable amount of the budget of the European Union (EU) is spent on subsidies
for infrastructure investment in poor regions. Structural funds subsidize national in-
frastructure spending in underdeveloped regions with a GDP per capita of less than 75%
of the EU average. The cohesion fund supports environmental and tra¢c infrastructure
in member states with a GDP per capita of less than 90% of the EU average (Boldrin and
Canova, 2001). In 2005, the EU used about 35% of its budget for those subsidies (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2005). After the recent enlargement of the EU, its budget share for
regional transfers is likely to increase signi…cantly in the next planning period 2007-2013.
Why are prospering countries willing to voluntarily support the infrastructure in
poorer countries by providing regional transfers? This question is of particular impor-
tance in order to understand the motives behind regional policy of the EU. As no central
government of the European Union exists, the EU policies are de…ned in multinational
agreements. Hence, it can be argued that regional policy of the EU re‡ects the interests
of the net payer countries.
An obvious …rst answer to the questionof why regional policies are implemented comes
from distributional considerations. Rich regions or federal governments give transfers to
poor regions due to an altruistic motive, where investment subsidies may be helpful in
speeding up income covergence. The literature on redistributive impacts of regional poli-
cies stresses the trade-o¤ between economic growth of the federation and regional income
equality, and …nds relatively small e¤ects on convergence (Martin, 1998, 1999; Boldrin
and Canova, 2001, 2003). Given the supranational structure of the EU, it seems doubtful
that the transfer rules were enacted for altruistic reasons or for providing insurance.
Second, regional policy instruments can be justi…ed by the goal of enhancing e¢ciency.
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that the existence of positive interregional or
international spillovers may lead regional governments to invest too little. This may
explain the use of federal matching grants for such investment projects, but not the
restricted access by poor regions. Another argument states that the locational decisions
of …rms are distorted when they cannot capture the full social bene…t of the investment
due to output price reactions. Again, an appropriate regional policy can correct such a
distortion. (Fuest andHuber, 2006). Further, the transfer rules governinga federal budget
1may give rise to vertical …scal externalities. If the federal taxationand transfer rules imply
that regions do not capture the full return to their investment, underinvestment results,
which calls for corrective subsidies (Fenge and Wrede, 2004).
Several authors have argued that increasing labor mobility across regions puts pres-
sure onintraregional redistribution from the rich tothe poor. Earmarked federal subsidies
then allow the sustainment of socially desirable levels of redistribution (Wildasin, 1991;
Wellisch and Wildasin, 1996; Figuières and Hindriks, 2002; Drèze et al., 2003). If immi-
grants represent a…scal burden tothe welfarestate, another obvious motivefor restraining
migration by sending transfers to the emigration countries arises. Bribing potential im-
migrants to stay at home can be cheaper than transferring resources to them through the
welfare scheme (Myers and Papageorgiou, 2000; Hatzipanayotou and Michael, 2005).
Finally, it may be possible that transfers according to regional policy rules represent
side payments in the multi-national political bargaining process. Our paper also tries to
give a positive explanation for the existence of the EU regional policy. However, in our
approach, the net payers choose the volume and the structure of regional policy.
Our paper presents an additional explanation for the existence of regional policy.
According to this view, regional transfers can reduce immigration into unemployment.
This line of reasoning seems to be quite relevant in the current accesion period with ten
newmember states, most ofthem Eastern Europeanlow-wage countries. The old member
states try to defend their high wages, which are supported by generous unemployment
bene…ts. Free migration then leads to higher unemployment among natives in the rich
countries. In such a situation, free mobility of labor, being one of the basic liberties in
the EU, will yield welfare losses. Hence, rich countries would like to see workers from the
new member states staying where they are. This may be achieved by regional transfers
that improve the lot of workers in Eastern Europe.
We consider afederationwithtwo representativecountries or regions thatdi¤er in their
endowment with private capital and infrastructure. As workers are not perfectly mobile,
a di¤erential in expected wages between the two countries remains under free mobility.
Unemployment prevails in the rich country where the wage is …xed above the market
clearing level due to a bene…t granted to the unemployed. Both countries have regional
budgets to …nance investment in infrastructure. The federal government is represented
in a budget that …nances the subsidies to the member states. The parameters of the
2budget are determined by the two countries. The rich country makes a take-it-or-leave-
it o¤er to the poor country by proposing the levels of the federal subsidies. It can use
two instruments to avoid the attraction of workers, namely, wage subsidies and matching
grants for infrastructure investment in the poor country. In our setup, wage subsidies are
equivalenttounconditional transfers. All resultscanimmediately berewrittenaccordingly
if unconditional transfers are analyzed as an alternative policy instrument.
Wage subsidies obviously directly reduce the migration incentive, as the wage di¤er-
ential becomes smaller. Subsidies in the form of matching grants for infrastructure also
serve to reduce the migration incentive by bringing a tax relief to poor countries. Up to
this point, the two instruments may be recognized as equivalent. On top of this, subsi-
dies for investment in infrastructure will induce the government of the poor country to
invest more. This investment in infrastructure attracts capital and drives up the marginal
product of labor. Although both the …nancial transfer and the out‡ow of capital harm
workers in the rich economies, the losses may be more thano¤set. The shrinking wage gap
helps the rich country to overcome its unemployment problem. Introducing either wage
subsidies or matching grants for investment in infrastructure is shown to have a positive
impact on the welfare of voters in the rich country. The latter instrument is preferred due
to its incentive e¤ect on regional public investment if the level of the federal budget for
regional policy is given and su¢ciently small. This result may serve as an explanation for
the exclusive use of matching grants in the EU.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In
Section 3, we analyze the comparative static changes of the migration equilibrium when
policy measures are exogenous. The next two sections 4 and 5 investigate the interactions
between the policies in the rich and the poor country and their impacts on the migration
equilibrium. Finally, Section 6 concludes and indicates directions for future research.
2 The Model
We consider a one-period model with two countries, the rich country A and the poor
country B. In each country, …rms produce a private good by using labor L, capital
K, and public infrastructure G. While labor and capital are mobile across countries,
public infrastructure is a …xed factor. The total output of a representative …rm in region
3j 2 fA;Bg is
Yj = ª(Gj)F(Kj;Lj); (1)
where Kj is the capital stock in country j and Lj is total employment in j: The neoclas-
sical production function F exhibits constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal
products. The public input Gj causes an external e¤ect on production captured by ª > 0,









denotes the capital-labor ratio, and f0 > 0 and f00 < 0 hold. A large
number of small …rms produce in a competitive market where the external e¤ect on
each …rm is negligible. Every …rm views itself as having a constant returns to scale
production function. This preserves exhaustion of …rm revenue by factor payments. Each
factor is paid according to its respective marginal productivity where changes in the scale
parameter ª are not taken into account. Since capital is perfectly mobile across countries




The wage rates wj are then given by
wj = ª(Gj)[f(kj)¡ kjf
0(kj)]: (4)
For any given period, the capital market equilibrium dictates that both the capital-labor
ratio and the wage rate will be higher in the country with more public infrastructure,
that is, we have kA > kB and wA > wB as long as GA > GB is valid. The total supply of
capital is given. Capital is fully employed such that
K = kALA+ kBLB (5)
is constant.
Public infrastructure in country j, Gj, is the sum of the initial stock, Gj0, plus invest-
ment, Ij.
Gj = Gj0 + Ij: (6)
4The countries di¤er in their initial endowment with the public input. At the outset,
the rich country displays a higher stock of infrastructure than the poor country, that
is GA0 > GB0 > 0. While an instantaneous or even forward-looking capacity e¤ect of
public investment is of course very strange, we use this assumption to keep the structure
of our model as simple as possible. If this formulation is taken literally, we need a third
economy that delivers the investment goods at an interest rate of zero before production
in the period under consideration starts.
There is a …xed minimum wage in country A that the government sets above the
market clearing wage rate. This minimum wage rate wA is legally determined to be
higher than the unemployment bene…t bA, that is, wA > bA. Alternatively, wA can be
seen as the workers’ reservation wage given the level of the unemployment bene…t.
It should be noted that the minimum wage in country A determines all factor prices
and capital-labor ratios. At a given level of public infrastructure, the wage in A uniquely
corresponds to a capital-labor ratio kA according to equation (4). With GA and kA being
…xed, the interest rate can be found on the factor price frontier of country A, as expressed
by (3). Perfect capital mobility then enforces the same interest rate in country B, being
associated with one particular capital-labor ratio kB, which again can be seen from (3).
Finally, if the stock of infrastructure GB and the capital-labor ratio kB are given, the
wage in country B is determined through equation (4).
Full employment in country B prevails because the wage is ‡exible there. If we had
some unemployment in country B, workers would underbid the equilibrium wage which
attracts capital to country B and drives up the demand for labor. Hence, all unemploy-
ment resulting from wages being too high will occur in country A: At given capital-labor
ratios kA > kB, migration from B to A will result in a total employment loss despite the
fact that some capital will move along with the immigrants.
Individuals draw utility from consuming c units of a private good and living in a
particular country. The total number of individuals is N with N = NA + NB, where
Nj denotes the number of citizens of country j. During the period under consideration,
nobody can change her citizenship. The N individuals di¤er in their attachment to their
home country. There is a continuum of individuals of each type indexed by n; where n
varies between 0 and N. Utility is additively separable, where the arguments refer to




c +®(N ¡ n) if n lives in A
c +®n if n lives in B
(7)
The variable n expresses utility of living in region B; and N ¡n is utility from living
in region A. The parameter ® ¸ 0 measures the degree of individual mobility. If ® = 0,
then individuals have no attachment to their home country and draw utility only from
consumption. If ® > 0 holds, individuals with a small n will choose to live in country A;
while individuals with a large n will be found in country B. When mobility is imperfect,
free migration will generally not equalize the expected wage rates. In the limiting case
® ! 1, individuals are perfectly immobile.
The distribution of regional preferences is biased towards home attachment. The
citizens of country A have regional preference parameters in the range [0;NA], while the
support of regional preference parameters of citizens of country B is (NA;N]. Hence,
we will not have migration in both directions. In the following we focus on migration
equilibria in which some citzens of country B choose to work in country A:
Each individual has to decide in which region she would like to live. She supplies one
unit oflabor in her preferredregion j at the wage wj. A nation’s capital stock is uniformly
distributed among its citizens. The capital stock per capita possessed by citizens of region
A is higher than the corresponding property of citizens of country B, that is, ^ kA > ^ kB.
Hence, a citizen of country i receives a capital income r^ ki. Further, an individual has
to pay taxes to the regional government of the country in which she lives, ¿j, and to
the federation, µ. In country A; an unemployment insurance contribution tA …nances the
unemployment bene…t bA, where the probability of being unemployed is 1¡¼A. The wage
rate in country B is supplemented by the federal transfer sB. Consumption of a citizen
of country i living in country j is given by
ci
j = ¼j (wj +sj ¡ tj) + (1¡ ¼j)bj + r^ ki ¡ ¿j ¡ µ; (8)
with sA = tB = bB = 1 ¡ ¼B = 0. The migration equilibrium is characterized by the
marginal individual, denoted by n = M, who is indi¤erent between residing in either
region:
6cA + ®(N ¡ M) = cB + ®M: (9)
As the marginal migrant is a citizen of country B, we suppress the superscript index.
All individuals of type n < M reside in region A, and all individuals of type n > M
live in region B: Hence, M is also the number of individuals living in region A; and the
employment probability is given by ¼A = LA=M:
Assuming that there is no discrimination against foreigners on the labor market, the
unemployment rates of native workers and immigrants are identical, as in the Harris-
Todaro (1970) framework. The view taken here is that immigrants have immediate access
to unemployment bene…ts, and jobs are randomly distributed. The alternative approach
that all unemployed are natives due a to smaller reservation wage of foreigners, possi-
bly caused by a delayed inclusion into unemployment insurance, has been pursued by
Brecher and Choudhri (1987). This scenario may even strengthen the motive to restrict
immigration.
Public investment is pre-…nanced by increasing public debt. Since the tax ¿j is col-
lected after migration has taken place, it is relevant for migration decisions. The unem-
ployment bene…t and the unemployment insurance contribution in country A cancel out
against each other as components that a¤ect utility. The migration equilibrium is given
by
¼AwA ¡ ¿A+ ®(N ¡ M) = wB + sB ¡ ¿B + ®M: (10)
While immigration does not change wages, it harms the native population in the rich
country because the unemployment rate among native workers goes up. However, at the
same time a given public investment level will be associated with a decreasing regional
lump-sum tax.
The federal government subsidizes the poorer region in two ways. First, by a match-
ing grant at rate ¾ for the regional investment in public infrastructure. Second, by a
complementary transfer sB per worker to the wage income. Its budget equation is
µ(NA+ NB) = ¾IB +sBLB: (11)
Each regional government imposes a lump-sum tax ¿j to …nance its cost share of the
investment in public infrastructure, Ij. This tax is levied from all residents in country
7j. The unemployment bene…t in country A is high enough to meet this tax requirement.
Noting that the federation subsidizes public investment at a matching grant rate ¾; the
regional investment budget constraints are
¿j ~ Nj = (1 ¡ ¾j)Ij (12)
with ~ NA = M; ~ NB = N ¡ M, ¾A = 0; and ¾B = ¾.
In addition, the government of country A provides an unemployment bene…t bA …-
nanced by a lump-sum unemployment contribution tA:
tALA = bA(M ¡ LA): (13)
The sequence of events is as follows. Initially, the stocks of public infrastructure,
GA0 and GB0, the property rights on production capital, the unemployment bene…t in
the rich country, and the wage in country A are given. The government of A sets its
public investment IA, the wage subsidy sB and the investment subsidy rate ¾ so as to
maximize aggregate utility of its citizens. The government of the rich country A controls
regional policy. Since the federal budget is spent exclusively in the poor country B;
enacting some regional policy will generally be in the interest of country B: Knowing
the co-…nancing rate ¾ and the level of the wage subsidy, the government of country B
chooses its investment IB to maximize utility of the median voter. Since the decision
may be modi…ed in a post-migration situation, the median voter is never a migrant. The
lump-sum taxes on the federal and regional level are adjusted instantaneously so as to
equalize thebudget. Capital and labor take all policy variables as givenand move until the
interest rate is equalized and the migration incentive vanishes. While the government of
the poor country B neglects the impact of its investment decision on migration ‡ows, the
government of country A has perfect foresight with respect to all adjustment processes.
3 Migration equilibrium and comparative statics
Lemma 1 collects the impacts of changing the public input on capital-labor ratios and
factor prices.
Lemma 1: Increasing public infrastructure in country A reduces the capital-labor ratio
in country A; raises the interest rate, and reduces both the capital-labor ratio in country
8B and the wage rate in country B. Increasing public infrastructure in country B does
neither a¤ect the capital-labor ratio in country A nor the interest rate, and raises both the
capital-labor ratio in country B and the wage rate in country B.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤
The results can be explained as follows. With an increasing public infrastructure in
country A, its factor price frontier shifts outwards. The …xed wage can be achieved at
a smaller capital labor-ratio. The new interest rate associated with this wage on the
new factor price frontier is higher due to both the increased productivity and the smaller
capital-labor ratio. The higher interest rate requires a reduction of the capital labor-ratio
in country B to increase the productivity of capital. This reaction reduces the marginal
productivity oflabor in country B, whichinturndrives down the wagerate inits economy.
When public infrastructure of country B rises, this will not have any e¤ect on the
capital-labor ratio in country A, the latter being determined exclusively by the …xed
wage and the level of public infrastructure in that economy. With a given stock of public
infrastructure in country A and an unchanged capital-labor ratio, the interest rate cannot
move. Since the productivity of capital rises in country B, the demand for capital will
increase such that B arrives at a higher capital-labor ratio. Both productivity enhance-
ment by the additional public capital stock and the rising capital-labor ratio contribute
to a higher marginal productivity of labor, being re‡ected in a higher wage rate.
Employment in the rich country, LA, and its population, M; are jointly determined
by the full employment condition for capital and the migration equilibrium equation.













If we had full employment, the inequalities kA > K=N > kB are valid. Assuming that
we are not too far away from the full employment position, this relation of capital-labor
ratios still holds throughout our analysis. The dynamics of the system (14)-(15) is given
9by
_ LA = h1[g1(LA;M)]; (16)
_ M = h2[g2(LA;M)]; (17)
with h1(0) = h2(0) = 0; h
0
1 > 0 and h0
2 > 0. Hence, employment in country A increases
if capital is less than fully employed, and will be reduced if there is not enough capital
available to keep the capital-labor ratio kA constant. The second di¤erential equation
states that migration follows the direction of the utility di¤erential. With this speci…-











> 0 are met at the equilibrium point. In
the following, we assume that these su¢cient stability conditions are satis…ed. While the





M2 < 0 (18)
is valid. Otherwise, disturbing the equilibrium by some small movement of population
would cause additional migration in the same direction, taking the two economies further
away from the equilibrium position.
The Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the third stability condition. Notice that the slopes
























. Otherwise, the equilibrium is a saddle point, as in Figure 1. If the condition
is ful…lled, we have a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium, as shown in Figure 2.




























M ¡kB = 1
M [K ¡ NkB] is positive by assumption. Further, ¢ > 0 implies
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_ M = 0
_ LA = 0
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Fig. 2. Stable equilibrium
11The reaction of employment in the rich country, LA, and its population M to changes
in the two regional policy instruments at given investment policies are summarized in
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: With given investment levels in both countries, raising either the wage
subsidy sB or the co-…nancing rate ¾ increases the population of country B and reduces
both employment and the unemployment rate in country A.
Proof. See Appendix B. ¤
Increasing the wage subsidy or reducing the regional infrastructure tax makes living
in country B more attractive. Therefore, population in country A will decline. It should
be noted that factor prices and capital-labor ratios are not a¤ected by the population
shift. Since workers need less capital at the workplace in country B than in country A,
and capital is still fully employed, employment in country A falls less than its population.
As the initial allocation is assumed to be close to full employment, the employment
probability goes up and the unemployment rate goes down. Recognizing that Lemma 2
captures only changes of net taxes while ignoring impacts on the investment behavior, it
is unsurprising that the two instruments work in a perfectly symmetric fashion.
Lemma 3 considers the impacts of changing the levels of public infrastructure through
some additional investment.
Lemma 3: Increasing investment in infrastructure in country A (dIA = dGA >
0) raises its population and its employment level if @wB
@GA
· ¡ 1
M . The employment
probability decreases and the unemployment rate in country A goes up if, in addition,
the mobility parameter ® is su¢ciently small. Increasing investment in infrastructure in




N ¡M : The employment probability rises and unemployment in country A
decreases if, in addition, ® is su¢cently small.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
As already noted in Lemma 1, investment in infrastructure in country A increases the
interest rate and reduces the wage rate in country B as well as the capital-labor ratio in
both countries. The two falling capital-labor ratios lead to a higher employment level in
country A as to restore full employment of capital. The rise in the regional tax of country
A tends to reduce its population, while there is an opposite impact due to the fall of the
12wage in country B. If the condition @wB
@GA
· ¡ 1
M is met, the latter e¤ect works stronger.
At a given distribution of the population, more employment in country A translates
intoa higher employment probability, whichagain tends to induce migration from country
B to country A. With given capital-labor ratios, migration from country B to country A
will be accompanied by a capital ‡ow in the same direction, which in turn is associated
with an increasing employment level in country A, and vice versa. Lemma 3 gives a
su¢cient condition under which both population and employment in country A rise. It
is shown that the unemployment rate in country A will go up if household mobility is
su¢ciently strong.
Investment in public infrastructure in country B increases both the capital-labor ratio
and thewage rateincountry B. Theformer e¤ect yields a fall in employment incountry A
because capital tends to be attracted to country B. While the rising wage rate in country
B induces remigration to country B, the increase in the regional tax of country B works
in the opposite direction. If the condition @wB
@GB
¸ (1¡ ¾)
N ¡ M is satis…ed, the former e¤ect
dominates the latter. As will be demonstrated in the next section, country B chooses its
investment policy such that this condition will always hold.
The declining employment level in country A will cause some migration to country
B. At given capital-labor ratios, a higher population in country B will induce capital
movements to the poor country, which again reduces employment in country A. Hence,
under thecondition given in Lemma3, the cross e¤ects reinforce the direct impacts. It can
thenbe concluded that investment in country B reduces both population and employment
in country A. At the same time, theemployment probability goes up if householdmobility
is su¢ciently strong.
4 Investment policy of country B
The government of country B takes the infrastructure stock of the rich country, GA, the
wage subsidy, sB; and the matching grant rate for its investment, ¾, as given. It chooses
its infrastructure investment IB so as to maximize the interest of its median voter. Since
the median voter will never be a migrant, the interests of emigrants are not taken into
13account. Instead, the government maximizes consumption of a voter living in country B,




sB(N ¡ M)+ ¾IB
N
; (20)
with respect to IB. The government ignores the impacts on the regional and the federal
tax that arise through repercussions of migration responses. This assumption is taken
to illustrate our arguments in a simple fashion. The approach may be justi…ed in the
European context, where we have many small countries that receive transfers. In case of













Raising public infrastructure in country B increases the wage in this economy but does
not a¤ect capital income per capita. Both the regional tax and the federal tax go up.
Lemma 4 describes how the government of country B reacts to changing regional
policy parameters.
Lemma 4: Increasing either the investment subsidy ¾ or the wage subsidy sB induces
more investment in infrastructure in country B. Raising investment in infrastructure in
the rich country, IA; decreases investment in infrastructure in country B if the former is
associated with a nondecreasing population in country A.
Proof. See Appendix D. ¤
With a higher investment subsidy, the regional tax goes down and the federal tax goes
up. As the reduction in the regional tax exceeds the increase in the federal tax, the tax
price of investment in infrastructure is reduced in country B. This falling price tends to
increase investment. Moreover, the higher subsidy rate for public investment will induce
migration to country B at any given investment level. Immigration to country B reduces
its regional tax, which adds to the stronger incentives for investment in infrastructure.
Raising the wage subsidy reduces the regional tax at any given infrastructure invest-
ment plan, because the additional transfer from country A to country B will induce
migration to country B. This e¤ect tends to increase investment in country B:
With a higher stock of infrastructure in country A, the response of the wage rate in
country B to a higher investment in country B weakens. Taken in isolation, this feature
tends to reduce investment in country B. At the same time, if investment in country A
14raises its population, the rise in the regional tax of country B upon investment in country
B becomes stronger. This would reinforce the former e¤ect. However, as a negative
correlation between investment and population in country A at the margin cannot be
ruled out, the two impacts may also have opposite signs.
5 Policy of country A
Consider now the decision of the government of country A: It chooses its investment plan
IA, the wage subsidy for the poor country, sB, and the public investment matching grant
rate ¾. Since all citizens of the rich country A live in their home country, the problem of








sB(N ¡ M)+ ¾IB
N
; (22)
with respect to sB; ¾, and IA.
Country A acts as a Stackelberg leader and takes into account the investment response
of country B. If we have interior solutions, the optimality conditions for the policy






















































































































15The investment policy of country A will mainly be driven by the motive to raise capital
income, as captured by @r
@GA






, the additional individuals share the burden of the regional tax. Since less
people remain in country B, the federal tax falls if wage subsidies are positive. These








: However, there are several negativeimpacts,
such that the boundary solution IA = 0 may well be the outcome. First, as @(LA=M)
@IA
< 0
typically holds, more investment in country A will reduce wage income of the native work-
ers by decreasing the employment probability in country A. Second, increasing investment
at a given population requires a higher regional tax, as expressed by ¡ 1
M > 0:
In addition, repercussions via an impact of investment in the poor country B may
occur. A higher investment in country B a¤ects welfare in country A as follows. As
explained earlier, it will increase the employment probability in country A and induce
migration from country A to country B. The employment e¤ect raises expected labor
income in country A, as shown by @(LA=M)
@IB
wA > 0: The migration response increases the









< 0: Last, more investment directly increases the
federal tax to …nance additional investment subsidies, which reduces welfare in country
A according to ¡ ¾
N < 0:
The following proposition deals with the introduction of matching grants and wage
subsidies.
Proposition 1: Provided that the mobility parameter ® is su¢ciently small, intro-
ducing either wage subsidies or investment subsidies increases welfare of country A.
Proof. See Appendix E. ¤
Proposition 1 shows that both wage subsidies and matching grants for investment
in infrastructure serve to increase the welfare of the natives in the rich country. The
direct impacts of the two instruments are perfectly symmetric. At a given distribution of
the population, the federal tax must increase due to higher wage subsidies or matching
grants. As living in the rich country becomes less attractive and living in the poor country
becomes more attractive, using either instrument induces migration from the rich country
to the poor country. As a consequence, a higher share of the population can be employed
in the rich country despite the out‡ow of physical capital. Moreover, the federal tax goes
16up if wage subsidies are positive, and the regional tax rises if public investment in country
A is positive. It turns out that the fall of the unemployment rate is the dominating
impact if the subsidies are at a very low level and labor mobility is su¢ciently strong.
In addition, both instruments have a positive impact on investment in the poor country.
As a consequence, the wage di¤erential diminishes, which again yields remigration to the
poor country and a fall of the unemployment rate in the rich country. When subsidies are
still small, the gains from a higher employment rate outweigh the additional tax burden
arising for individuals living in the rich country.
Surprisingly, it can be shown that an optimum policy is never characterized by an
interior solution for the investment subsidy. Considering a situation in which the …rst-
order condition holds, the impact of additional investment in the poor country on welfare
in rich country will typically be negative due to a rising tax burden.
Proposition 2: Provided that investment in country A is su¢ciently small, and an
interior optimum for the level of investment subsidies is achieved, replacing investment
subsidies by wage subsidies is bene…cial for country A.
Proof. See Appendix F. ¤
Proposition 2 rules out candidates for an optimum policy with an interior solution for
the investment subsidy. Such a situation displays the feature that the net impact of the
…scal transfer on welfare in the rich country is still positive while at the same time addi-
tional investment already harms the natives in the rich economy. Since matching grants
give a stronger stimulus for investment in infrastructure in the poor country, replacing
them partially by wage subsidies is advantageous for the people living in the rich country.
A similar argument can be given when considering a policy with a matching grant rate
at the maximum level, say 100%, accompanied by wage subsidies. Therefore, the single
possible unconstrained optimum would display wage subsidies only. As equilibria with
high investment levels due to a large federal budget tend to be unstable according to (19),
such an analysis is not conclusive, however. For practical purposes, it seems more plau-
sible to assume a limited budget of the federation, as it is the case with the EU regional
budget, where the current expenditure level would be re‡ected in an income tax of .35 per
cent. If the limit is su¢ciently low, Proposition 3 shows that an optimum policy will be
characterized by using matching grants only. Interpreted in this way, our model explains
why matching grants represent the preferred policy instrument.
17Proposition 3: If the federal tax µ is constant and small, and if the mobility para-
meter ® is su¢ciently small, the optimum policy for country A is to use matching grants
for public investment only.
Proof. See Appendix G. ¤
Having a federal budget being su¢cently small ensures that both types of subsidies
have a positive impact on the rich country at the margin. Moreover, the rich country
then also bene…ts from additional investment in country B. Since the matching grant
policy has a stronger impact on investment in the poor country, it is the preferred policy
instrument.
6 Conclusions
Our analysis has explored a newrationale for the use of matching grants as an instrument
of regional policy. When rich countries try to defend their high wages, regional policy
serves to reduce immigration into unemployment. While an unconditional transfer or a
wage subsidy also makes staying in a poor country more attractive, matching grants for
public investment exhibit an additional advantage. They induce more public investment,
which in turn increases labor productivity and reduces the wage gap. Given that federal
subsidies are relatively small compared to regional budgets, we have demonstrated that
giving the transfer in this fashion lies in the best interest of the rich country, as an
additional cut of the domestic unemployment rate can be achieved.
Our story heavily relies on sizeable output losses that come about when immigration
increases unemployment. If we have native working poor receiving in-work bene…ts in-
stead, gains of rich economies from bribing potential immigrants will be much smaller or
even negative.
If there is an uneven distribution of income, regional policy can be used in order to
deter migration with or without unemployment even if total income of the natives falls.
It may lie in the best interest of a majority of workers to employ matching grants in order
to achieve some target wage or unemployment rate at the lowest cost for capital owners,
where the latter bear the lion’s share of the tax load. Hence, we expect that similar
arguments as in our paper can be developed in a public choice perspective.
A possible extension of the current model may investigate a scenario in which poor
18countries take the migration responses to their public investment policies into consider-
ation. While this complicates the analysis substantially, it is not obvious if, and how, it
changes our results.
We have ignored the stylized fact of highunemployment …gures inthe newEU member
states. Having unemployment in the poor country does not change the main line of the
argument. Inducing additional investment in infrastructure by matching grants will then
help to cut unemployment in the poor country. Technically, incorporating unemployment
by …xingwagesinbothcountries yields serious problems, as all mobile capital will typically
be found in one country only. Such a boundary equilibrium can turn out due to the
absence of a mechanism that equalizes interest rates. Hence, analyzing interior equilibria
with unemployment in both countries requires a more complicated structure.
Finally, the impacts that are illustrated in our approach with homogenous labor may
be perceived as too strong. With di¤erent skill groups in the labor market, only the low
skilledmay su¤er fromminimumwageunemployment. Aswe have migrationincentives for
all skill groups in the EU context, the problem of immigration into unemployment will be
typically be mitigated by skilled migration. This is true when skilled and unskilled labor
are complements in production. Skilled immigration then raises the marginal product of
labor, which tends to reduce unemployment among the unskilled. However, the mere fact
that several old member states in the EU have chosen a transition period regime with
restricted labor mobility indicates a widespread fear of strong impacts of free migration
on unemployment.
19Appendix
A: Proof of Lemma 1



































































B: Proof of Lemma 2


































































































Notice that LAkA ¡ MkB = K ¡ kBN > 0 has to hold in order to satisfy the stability
condition ¢ > 0 even if we have small values of ®. ¤
C: Proof of Lemma 3






















































































































Combiningthe conditions inLemma3 withthestabilitycondition(18) yields theresult
for population and employment level in both countries. The change of the employment












































































M kA ¡ kB = 1
M [K ¡ NkB] > 0. If ® ¡! 0 and under the conditions
for marginal changes of wB in the lemma unemployment increases with infrastructure
investment in country A and decreases with infrastructure investment in country B. ¤




































































< 0 holds then proves the
claim. ¤
E: Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 4, we have @IB
@¾ > 0 and @IB
@sB
> 0: Using the optimality condition for



























































































































































holds. Again, we have Z2 > 0 if the mobility parameter ® is su¢ciently small. If this
condition holds, and if we consider sB = ¾ = 0, we arrive at @UA
@¾ > 0 and @UA
@sB
> 0. ¤
F: Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that (IA0;sB0;¾0) represents a candidate for an optimum policy of country A,
with 0 < ¾0 < 1. From Lemma 4, we have @IB
@¾ > 0 and @IB
@sB
> 0: Considering Z1
and Z2 as de…ned in the proof of Proposition 1, it immediately follows that we must








= N ¡ M
IB
@M
@¾ hold. Increasing sB and reducing ¾ such that
d¾ = ¡N ¡ M
IB



































Hence, (IA0;sB0;¾0) cannot be an optimum policy of country A. ¤
G: Proof of Proposition 3
Varying the investment subsidy and the wage subsidy against each other such that the




























Notice that both the numerator and the denominator of this expression are positive. The
impact of increasing µ on the representative voter’s utility at a balanced federal budget



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27The sign of the last expression is ambiguous. It will be positive for small ® and a suf-
…ciently small public budget µ, where the latter implies small values of ¾ and sB. In






2 > 0: Hence, for a su¢ciently
small budget, replacing wage subsidies by matching grants for infrastructure at a balanced
budget increases welfare in country A. ¤
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